Injured On An Airplane?

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Reprinted from The Washington Post

By Sholnn Freeman

Accidents on charter flights killed 66 people in the United States last year, the highest total since 2000, transportation safety officials said yesterday.

The air charter category includes medical helicopters, tour flights and air taxis.

That toll compared with 43 air-charter deaths in 2007, according to the National Transportation Safety Board’s annual review of aviation accident statistics. The agency recently put the spotlight on the safety of medevac helicopter services. Those helicopters were involved in four accidents last year, resulting in 15 deaths. That included a crash in Prince George’s County that killed four people.

The safety board’s figures showed that general aviation remained the deadliest form of air travel, accounting for 495 of the 564 fatalities in U.S. civil aviation last year. There were 1,559 accidents last year in general aviation, which includes a variety of personal and business flights not run by the commercial airlines.

Large commercial carriers were involved in 20 accidents last year, down from 26. There were no deaths. They 753 million passengers on 10.6 million flights.

Commuter airlines, which often fly smaller aircraft, made 581,000 flights. They had seven accidents in 2008, none of them fatal.

There were three deaths in cargo-related accidents.

Commercial aviation in the United States had been having an uncommonly quiet period, as measured by aviation deaths, for the past two years, but that ended with two high-profile accidents this year. In February, a commuter turboprop crashed into a home outside Buffalo, killing 50 people. Last month, a small plane crashed in Butte, Mont., resulting in 14 deaths, including several children.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/02/AR2009040203740.html?hpid=sec-health

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Reprinted from the Seattle Times

BY:Steve Miletich

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors overlooked potential evidence before clearing an Alaska Airlines contractor of air-safety violations alleged by a whistle-blower, according to newly disclosed government records.

Some people with additional information were not interviewed by the FAA during the 2007 investigation, prompting an investigator for the federal Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), who separately examined the whistle-blower’s case, to write a pointed letter to FAA officials.

The letter identified broader safety allegations against the repair contractor, American Power, than those raised by the whistle-blower.

OSHA, after its investigation, found American Power retaliated against the whistle-blower by laying her off, leading to a settlement in October of nearly $30,000. The Auburn tool-supply and repair company went out of business about Jan. 1.

FAA officials declined to comment on the case, but the agency recently released copies of the OSHA investigator’s letter and other records to The Seattle Times under a Freedom of Information Act request.

The FAA began investigating the allegations against American Power in late 2007, when former employee Melodee Nixon alleged she was laid off after accusing the company of ignoring federal air-safety standards.

Nixon said she warned superiors the company was providing false data to Alaska Airlines relating to the recalibration of gauges on oxygen and nitrogen regulators. The regulators are used by the airline, among other things, during maintenance of oxygen masks, tires and struts.

American Power’s work for Alaska was done by a subcontractor, Hansen & Miller Service Center of Seattle.

Nixon told the FAA that American Power was receiving incomplete information from Hansen & Miller certifying how each regulator was calibrated, FAA records show.

“Ms. Nixon stated she was instead asked to cut and paste the calibration information from a previous invoice and paste it into the current invoice,” an FAA inspector wrote.

Even if work is done correctly, the FAA requires strict record-keeping to catch errors before they lead to major problems and to trace the maintenance history after a crash or other mishap.

FAA inspectors determined American Power had asked its employees to cut and paste previous data relating to Hansen & Miller’s work, according to FAA records. But the FAA concluded American’s action wasn’t falsification because the company believed the practice was acceptable, based on the data it was receiving from Hansen & Miller.

American Power acknowledged shortcomings, agreed to bolster its procedures and stopped doing business with Hansen & Miller, the records show.

The FAA considered opening a preliminary investigation of Alaska Airlines, which is responsible for its contractors. But the airline was ultimately found to be not at fault after producing adequate paperwork.

The FAA investigation consisted of interviewing Nixon, Alaska officials and the president of American Power, but no other company employees, according to the records.

OSHA gets involved

Nixon then went to OSHA, which investigated her layoff under a law designed to protect aviation-industry whistle-blowers.

After a lengthy investigation, OSHA determined American Power had retaliated against Nixon after she raised a valid safety issue. She received nearly $30,000 in lost wages and medical benefits from American, which denied any wrongdoing.

OSHA said it did not determine whether safety violations occurred because that is the FAA’s job.

But during its inquiry, OSHA investigator Rebecca Phelps wrote a letter to the FAA, dated April 2, 2008, that raised questions about other work done by American Power for Alaska.

“Another American Power employee, other than Ms. Nixon, indicated that in-house calibration of tools and hoists at American Power are being ‘fabricated’ or falsified,” Phelps wrote. “The employee stated that calibrations in the morning when the shop is cold are basically ‘fixed’ so that the tools and hoists can pass calibration.”

For some tools, environmentally controlled rooms are required if called for by the original equipment’s manufacturer for the tool’s calibration, according to Alaska.

The employee also reported that calibration work on devices called transducers had been shortened to save time, leading to false results, Phelps wrote. Transducers transfer power from one system and supply power usually in another form to a second system.

Phelps informed the FAA that the employee knew about an FAA visit to American Power in November 2007 during its investigation of Nixon’s complaint.

“According to this employee, the FAA Inspector did not go into the shop or talk with employees working in the shop,” Phelps wrote.

Phelps also informed the FAA that Hansen & Miller “told us that they were instructed by American Power to calibrate and/or repair the Alaska regulators, but were not instructed to provide certification paperwork to American Power.”

Hansen & Miller indicated it had not been questioned by the FAA, Phelps wrote.

Harold Heia, the owner of Hansen & Miller, confirmed part of Phelps’ account, telling The Times that American Power didn’t ask his company for certification information. However, he said an FAA official might have been part of a telephone conversation involving him, American Power and Alaska, but he wasn’t sure.

No response to letter

Phelps, who was a new employee when she wrote the letter, acted within bounds, said Dean Ikeda, OSHA’s deputy regional administrator in Seattle. She was counseled about the letter’s tone because it went beyond factual allegations and implied the FAA wasn’t doing its job, Ikeda said.

The FAA didn’t respond to the letter, Ikeda said.

FAA officials in Renton, SeaTac and Washington, D.C., declined to comment on the letter or the agency’s investigation of American Power.

The FAA came under intense criticism last year when it was revealed that Southwest Airlines was allowed to fly at least 117 aircraft past mandatory inspection deadlines.

U.S. Rep. James Oberstar, chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said at the time that the FAA should “clean house from top to bottom” and had too cozy a relationship with airlines.

Alaska stopped using American Power for calibration work in 2007 when it became aware of the FAA investigation, and it halted other repair work last year when it learned of OSHA’s inquiry.

Nixon said Phelps’ letter confirms what she related to one of the FAA inspectors. “You did not want to find anything wrong,” Nixon said she told the inspector.

Information from The Associated Press and Seattle Times archives is included in this report.

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009003725_faaprobe08m0.html

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Reprinted from The Wall Street Journal

Associated Press

BUTTE, Mont. — A small plane — possibly carrying children on a ski trip — crashed Sunday as it approached the Butte airport, killing 14 to 17 people aboard, a federal official said. The single engine turboprop nose-dived into a cemetery 500 feet from its destination.

The aircraft crashed and burned while attempting to land, said Federal Aviation Administration spokesman Mike Fergus. The plane crashed in Holy Cross Cemetery.

An investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board offered few details at a press conference in Butte Sunday night. No cause of the crash was given.

“We are just beginning our investigation,” said Kristi Dunks. “We don’t have a lot of information at this time. “Certain family members were contacted,” she said. “At this point, I don’t have an exact number.”

Ms. Dunks wouldn’t say if there had been a distress call from the pilot. It was partly cloudy, the visibility was 10 miles and winds were blowing from the northwest around 10 mph at the time of the crash, according to hourly temperature information from the National Weather Service.

The aircraft had departed from Oroville, Calif., and the pilot had filed a flight plan showing a destination of Bozeman, about 85 miles southeast of Butte. But the pilot canceled his flight plan at some point and headed for Butte, Mr. Fergus said. Preliminary reports indicate the dead include numerous children, he added.

“We think that it was probably a ski trip for the kids,” Mr. Fergus said.

Butte Silver-Bow Sheriff John Walsh said there were a few people at the cemetery at the time of the crash, but no one on the ground was injured. He would not describe witness reports.

Steve Guidoni of Butte said he was driving by the cemetery and saw the plane nosedive into the ground. He stopped and ran over to see if he could help.

“It smelled like diesel fuel to me,” said Mr. Guidoni, 61. “There was nothing left of it. It just went straight into the ground. I went over there to try to help. I thought maybe I would pull someone out of the fire.”

Mr. Guidoni said he saw luggage and seat cushions lying around, but no bodies. He said the biggest piece of the plane was the size of a kitchen table. “You wouldn’t even know a plane was there,” he said.

Nick Dipasquale, 19, was working at a gas station across the street. “I heard a loud bang,” he said. “It sounded like someone ran into the building.” He said he ran outside to see flames as tall as the trees. Mr. Dipasquale said people who were fueling their cars said they saw the plane flying low, begin a turn, start to wobble and then slam into the ground.

Mr. Fergus said the Pilatus PC-12 aircraft was manufactured in 2001. Such planes are certified to carry 12 people. The plane was registered to Eagle Cap Leasing Inc. in Enterprise, Ore., Mr. Fergus said. He didn’t know who was operating the plane.

I. Felkamp is listed in Oregon corporate records as Eagle Cap’s president. Attempts to reach him by phone were unsuccessful.

The flight originated at Brown Field Municipal airport in San Diego on Saturday evening and flew to Redlands, Calif., about 100 miles north, said Rachel Laing, a spokeswoman for the city of San Diego.

The plane left Sunday morning for Vacaville, Calif., according to Flight Aware. From there it flew to Oroville, Calif., and then to Butte. The NTSB could not confirm that information.

“We are still gathering the information of the aircraft, it’s purpose, what they were doing and where they were going,” Ms. Dunks said.

In California, Tom Hagler said he saw a group of about a dozen children and four adults Sunday morning at the Oroville Municipal Airport, about 70 miles north of Sacramento. Mr. Hagler, owner of Table Mountain Aviation, described the children as ranging from about six to 10 years old. He let the children into his building to use the restroom. “There were a lot of kids in the group,” he said. “A lot of really cute kids.”

Mr. Hagler said he showed the pilot where he could fuel his plane, and the pilot said he expected his flight to take two-and-a-half hours. The pilot didn’t file a flight plan at the Oroville airport.

National Transportation Safety Board spokesman Keith Holloway said its investigators were expected to arrive in Butte late Sunday or early Monday.

The crash is the fourth major plane accident in the U.S. in slightly more than three months.

On Dec. 20, Continental Airlines plane veered off a runway and slid into a snowy field at Denver International Airport, injuring 37 people. No one was killed. In January, a US Airways jetliner landed in New York’s Hudson River after a flock of geese disabled both its engines. All 155 people onboard survived. Last month, commuter plane fell on a house in a suburb of Buffalo, New York, killing all 49 passengers and a man in the home.

Before the Buffalo crash there hadn’t been an accident involving a commercial airliner in the U.S. in which there were fatalities in more than two years.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123776269774308481.html

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Reprinted from AOPA Online

By: Bruce Landsberg

Bruce Landsberg was named president of the Air Safety Foundation in February.

The great football coach Vince Lombardi used to exhort his Super Bowl-winning Green Bay Packers that “Winning isn’t everything—it’s the only thing.” That’s fine for professional sports, but shouldn’t “safety” replace “winning” as what pilots, and the agencies that oversee them, should be thinking? However, the FAA is charged with enforcement to be used when more collaborative methods for safety fail. Did they make the right choice in this case? What about the pilot? You be the judge.

There’s a program for everyone. There’s NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), which we’ll get to shortly. Another, and in the news lately, is the Aviation Safety Action Program, or ASAP. Operational for more than a decade, it allows airline pilots, mechanics, or anyone else to report without fear of punishment when they see something unsafe. It’s a good idea and a number of airlines signed up. As reports rolled in, hundreds if not thousands of operational changes were made.

According to the FAA’s advisory circular (AC 120-66B) on ASAP: “The objective of the ASAP is to encourage air carrier and repair station employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents. The FAA has determined that identifying these precursors is essential to further reducing the already low accident rate. Under an ASAP, safety issues are resolved through corrective action rather than through punishment or discipline.”

The AC continues that participants “…can identify and report safety issues to management and to the FAA for resolution, without fear that the FAA will use reports accepted under the program to take legal enforcement action against them, or that companies will use such information to take disciplinary action. These programs are designed to encourage participation from various employee groups, such as flight crewmembers, mechanics, flight attendants, and dispatchers.”

It’s a great concept, but toxic relationships between airline labor and management caused USAirways, Delta, and American Airlines to suspend their programs (Delta has since reinstated its program). Last year the FAA’s acting administrator voiced his disappointment at the standoff, as did the NTSB. The various parties were urged to stop bickering and go for the greater safety good.

But both agencies weren’t so high-minded in a recent case. Perhaps they had good reason to be tough. You decide. Another program—the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program—is also designed to open up communication, as long as operators confess before the FAA finds out about an infraction. Let’s go to the game tapes.

In 2004 a young charter pilot flying an old turboprop had difficulty extending the landing gear. According to FAA documents, after several recycles, he was about ready to blow the gear down using the backup system when it finally extended and he landed uneventfully. At this point, he should have written it up and called the company mechanic for advice. Instead, he flew the next leg of his trip with no problems. Upon landing he sought guidance. The tech replied that it was pretty common in cold weather and to just keep an eye on it. Two days later the pilot had the same problem and again he got the gear down. The pilot received the same advice from another mechanic and the chief of maintenance—just keep an eye on it.

Bad idea and in violation of the carrier’s operation specifications. Ops specs are the rules by which the company agrees to fly, and they specify in great detail exactly how things are to be done. The specs required that any maintenance discrepancy be noted in the aircraft log. A mechanic should analyze and defer the item or fix it. However, in the real world, write-ups may ground an aircraft, which means lost revenue, which means your services as a pilot may no longer be needed. It’s a Hobson’s choice for a new pilot.

The next day the pilot refused the aircraft and the dispatcher assigned a different pilot, but the gear hung up again. Pilot Two declared an emergency and diverted, eventually getting the gear down. At this point, the company decided it should report the incident through voluntary disclosure. The pilot declaring the emergency, the first pilot, the chief maintenance inspector, the dispatcher, and two technicians all participated in the disclosure.

They followed the guidelines in Advisory Circular 00-58, voluntarily advising the FAA of the incident and what the company was doing to prevent a recurrence. The FAA’s principal maintenance inspector (PMO) accepted the corrective action and responded, in writing, “the matter does not warrant legal enforcement action.” That might have been the end of it, but it wasn’t. Continued on page 48

A few months later the FAA’s regional attorney notified the first pilot that his certificate was being suspended, despite the letter from the PMO. Neither the company nor any other personnel were issued a violation, which sounds rather selective to me. An attorney took the pilot’s case and filed an appeal with NTSB to see if this apparent breach of safety faith could be rectified. The NTSB law judge, surprisingly, did not see anything egregious about the FAA’s conduct and ruled that he had no jurisdiction to review anything relevant to this advisory circular. He could only review the sanction and agreed to reduce it by 10 days (from 60 days) since the pilot had cooperated with the investigation. The pilot appealed, and the full NTSB agreed with the law judge. The only avenue left was a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals, and that is where the case is now being pursued.

That the pilot and all the other company staff violated a rule is not in question. That is acknowledged, and there are procedures for the FAA to refuse to accept any voluntary disclosure filing if it thinks the parties involved are not dealing in good faith. If you’ve got a bandit operator or pilot, that’s a different story, but it doesn’t appear to be the situation here. The PMO interviewed the airline employees, agreed with the remedies, and accepted the report.

The AOPA Air Safety Foundation is concerned about the adverse impact that the FAA’s enforcement posture under these circumstances may have on future participation in these voluntary reporting programs in particular and aviation safety in general.

For GA flight operations there is really only one program: NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was established to provide a solid flow of safety information while shielding the reporter from self-incrimination on a safety issue. It’s been around for decades and works well. You can go to AOPA Online or search for ASRS on the Web to file a report—by mail or electronically—to describe any safety problem. Your identification is stripped from the report before it gets forwarded to the appropriate groups. Even if the FAA identifies the reporter, if you’ve complied with the program, you’re protected from the sanction if not the violation.

It may be that NTSB has no authority to review this AC under current guidelines, but perhaps it should, just as it does with ASRS. Had the pilot also filed a report under ASRS, he would have been protected under the waiver-of-sanction provision. That may be the most practical message out of this unfortunate situation—whenever there is a “deal,” as ATC likes to call it, report it all ways, including through ASRS. This incident happened more than four years ago and the violation’s pending; a pilot’s career is derailed and he is waiting tables.

ASF enjoys a collaborative relationship with both the FAA and NTSB, as we should. We’re all here to make aviation as safe as possible. My hope is that perhaps legal and enforcement actions under these circumstances can be looked at with a broader view toward safety. Let’s collectively focus on preemptive activities, as opposed to merely punitive, since the payoff is much bigger.

Winning really isn’t everything, it’s how you play the game—especially if you wrote the rules.

http://www.aopa.org/asf/asfarticles/2009/sp0904.html